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Do Art Exhibitions Destroy Common-law
Copyright in Works of Art?
By RANDOLPH JONAKAIT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL

provided the model for early copyright
law. The concept of publication, critical for determining the
loss of common-law rights, was viewed as the public dissemination of a copy of the literary work. But a work of art,
such as a painting or sculpture, may never be copied yet
exposed to the view of thousands through a public exhibition.
Is such an exhibition a publication? In part because cases on
this question have been infrequent, the law is unclear. Still
the problem is obviously not without importance given the
large number of works of art daily exhibited in the United
States apparently with little attention to the possible loss of
copyright involved.
The problem in defining publication has been to draw a
line somewhere between 'the case of completely private enjoyment and the case of truly public distribution.' The perLITERARY WORKS

'Consequently different scholars have come up with different formulations
for publication.
"A general publication consists in such a disclosure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or distribution of the subject of copyright, tendered or given
to one or more members of the general public, as implies abandonment of the
right of copyright or its dedication to the public." Werckmeister v. American
Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1904).
"The public distribution of copies is the prototype of publication. This distribution generally takes place through sale, lease or circulation and does not
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haps misnamed doctrine of limited publication has introduced
facts such as the nature and size of the group to which the
work was distributed, the context of the distribution, and the
explicit restrictions, if any, placed on the work's use. Similarly, in the case of art exhibitions, there are a number of
factors which might be thought relevant.
The Conditions of Entry into the Exhibition. Under this
heading such questions might be asked as: Did the artist inquire about the conditions of display? What was the artist
told about such conditions? Did the artist submit his work
with any reservations about how the art could be exhibited?
The Purposes of Exhibition. The following questions might
be asked: Was the art for sale? Was the purpose of the exhibition to publicize the sale of reproductions? Was the artist
receiving money from the exhibition?
The Conditions of the Display. Relevant questions would
include: Was the exhibition open to the general public? Was
an admission fee charged? Did the place of display restrict
the copying of the art? If so, how was the notice of that
prohibition communicated to the viewers and how was it enforced? If the exhibition was not open to the public, to whom
was it limited? How long was the art displayed?
Unfortunately the extant opinions do not give guidance in
weighing those factors.
Although our concern here is with American law, we start
with an early British case, Turner v. Robinson.2 In 1857,
Henry Wallis painted The Death of Chatterton. Upon comembrace such preliminary steps as printing, advertising the work, or the sale or
offering for sale of the author's manuscript to a prospective publisher." A.
LATMAN, HoWELL's COPYRIGHT LAW 63 (4th ed. 1962).
"The relevant decisions indicate that publication occurs when by consent of
the copyright owner the original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased,
loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when
an authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner even
if a sale or other such disposition does occur." M. Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 185, 187 (1956). (Footnotes omitted.)
2 10 Ir. Ch. 121 (1860) ; aff'd, 10 Ir. Ch. 510 (App. 1860).
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pletion he exhibited the work at London's Royal Academy of
Art. The picture was then sold to Augustus Leopold Egg, who
displayed it again at the Royal Academy and also at the
Manchester Exposition. Egg sold the rights for an engraving
to Robert Turner, and the painting was subsequently lent to
Turner in order to show it at Dublin for the purpose of getting
subscribers to the engraving. James Robinson viewed the
picture at the Dublin exhibition and from memory constructed
a backdrop similar to the scene in The Death of Chatterton,
posed a servant in front of the construction to imitate the
Wallis original, photographed the setting, and made stereoscopic pictures from the photographs. Turner then sought
to enjoin the sale of those pictures.
The case was tried on the assumption that unless there had
been no publication, the painting was in the public domain
because the British copyright statute in force at that time did
not cover paintings. The Master of the Rolls held that no
publication had occurred.3 He quickly dispensed with the
exhibition at Dublin. To claim that a display for the purpose
of obtaining subscribers for an engraving was a publication,
he said, was "an extravagant proposition, as it would defeat
the very object for which the painting was exhibited." '
However, The Death of Chatterton had also been on general display at the Royal Academy and at the Manchester
Exposition. Whether those exhibitions constituted publications posed a more serious problem. The plaintiff argued that
a painting is never published at an exhibition, relying on
precedents that a public performance of a play was not a
publication. The court was unwilling to adopt such a broad
holding. Instead the opinion said that an exhibition of a
painting at a gallery which has rules against the making of
copies is not a publication.
The parties had not, however, presented adequate evidence
'The opinion contained no discussion of whether the sale from Wallis to
Egg constituted publication.
' 10 Ir. Ch. 121, 144 (1860).
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about the regulations on copying at the Royal Academy. The
Master of the Rolls felt he could not make a decision until
he had knowledge of the absence or presence of such rules;
so after chastising the parties for not presenting that information, the Master of the Rolls admitted that he had taken it
upon himself to have letters sent out inquiring about the
rules at the relevant exhibition halls:
I inquired, during the course of argument, whether there were any
rules or bye-laws of the Royal Academy preventing the taking of any
copy or sketch from the painting exhibited.... It is strange, where
the petitioner and respondent are artists, that no trouble should have
been taken to furnish the Court with information proper and necessary for the decision of this question. I did not wish, of course, to
decide a point so important to all painters, as to whether the exhibiting of a painting at the Royal Academy amounted to a publication, without knowing whether there were any such rules or
regulations as I have adverted to; and I have accordingly taken the
necessary steps to ascertain the facts, which ought to have been
ascertained and brought before the Court by petitioner. 5
The information so garnered indicated that the Academy
had rules restricting copying, so the court went on to hold that
it would, in such a case, be a clear breach of trust and confidence
on the part of the members of the Royal Academy to permit copies
or sketches to be taken, where it is assumed that paintings are sent
to the Royal Academy on the faith of such regulations. . ... The
exhibition at the Royal Academy was subject to the resolutions and
bye-law and it was, in my opinion, no publication, as it would have
been a breach of trust and a breach of implied contract to have
allowed the painting to be copied.6
This theory of protection appears to be closer to a holding

in contract law than to one in copyright. But the opinion
might be interpreted as saying that the distribution
a restricted purpose-that it was for viewing without
and therefore was a "limited publication" which did
common-law protection. The Lord Chancellor, on
5 Id. at 136-37.

aId. at 135 and 137.

was for
copying
not end
appeal,
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came even closer to using the term limited publication. First
he said:
No doubt, those exhibitions did give a certain amount of publication
to the picture. Any visitor to those exhibitions might discuss the
merits of the paintings,
or he might write a full account of the picture
7
in the newspaper.
But then the Lord Chancellor went on to hold that the exhibition was not a divesting publication because the rules
against reproductions made any copying a breach of trust.
While settling a narrow issue, neither the trial court nor
the appellate court expressly said that a painting displayed
at a gallery without restrictions on duplication would be a
publication of the painting. However, that is the clear implication of both opinions. The approach used by the Master of
the Rolls was novel, for Turner had obviously not considered
it important enough to present evidence on the matter; instead
he was willing to rest his argument on the assertion that no
exhibition of a painting is a publication. The courts, probably
swayed by a desire to give paintings as much common-law
protection as possible to offset the lack of statutory coverage,
rejected the contention, indicating that the argument had so
little merit that the conception of a new distinction was
warranted.
The Master of the Rolls showed the influence of the lack
of statutory coverage when he said that, in spite of his taking
on the burden of proof about the existence of rules against
duplication and of his reprimanding the plaintiff for not
presenting that key information, the burden of proof in the
future should probably be shouldered by the one alleging a
divesting publication.
Indeed it may be a question whether the onus of proof did not lie
on the respondent J. Robinson to prove that the exhibiting of a
painting at the Manchester Exposition amounted to a publication. It
is a startling proposition that all persons, whether the owners or
710

Jr.

Ch. 510, 516 (App. 1860).
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painters of paintings of great merit and value, and who conferred
the privilege on the public to view those paintings at the great exhibitions in London, Dublin or Manchester, forfeited thereby the very
insufficient protection which they are entitled to before publication,
by the Common Law. That there may be a qualified publication
there can be no doubt.8

Thus the court's predisposition was to protect the painter.
Still, since the plaintiff was arguing that there was no exhibition by presenting an analogy to the public performance of
a play, perhaps it is startling that the court did not go further

and declare all exhibitions as nonpublications. Its failure to
do so might indicate that the Master of the Rolls felt there
was something faulty with the analogy.
However, the appellate court indicated that if paintings

had been covered by a copyright act, even exhibitions with
restrictions on copying would be publications. This is implied
by the Lord Chancellor's comments about statues which were
so protected.
Again, in the statutes bestowing protection upon works of sculpture,
the terminus a quo from which that protection commences is the
publication of the work, that is, from the moment the eye of the
public is allowed to rest upon it. Many large works in this branch of
art, which decorate public squares and other places, are of course so
published; but there are others, not designed for such purposes,
which could never be published in other ways than in exhibitions;
therefore I apprehend that these works of sculpture must be considered as "published," by exhibitions at such places as the Royal
Academy and Manchester, so as to entitle them to the protection of
the statutes, from the date of such publication. 9

Yet the Lord Chancellor held that a similar showing of a
painting was not a publication. The essential difference between the two rulings does not seem to be anything in the
nature of the two types of art-surely there are many paintings that cannot be displayed outdoors and can only be ex-

hibited in galleries and museums. Instead the distinguishing
810 Ir. Ch. 121, 139-40 (1860).
*10 Ir. Ch. 510, 516 (App. 1860).
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difference seems only to be that paintings were not then covered by a copyright law, while statues were. This clearly
implies that if both statues and paintings had been protected,
then paintings, like statues, would have been held published
at an exhibition, even if the gallery had restrictions on
copying.
This hypothesis cannot be tested, however. Shortly after
Turner, the Fine Arts Copyright Act became law."0 This act
expressly gave protection to both published and unpublished
paintings, thus downgrading the importance of the concept
of publication of paintings in Great Britain. Consequently,
no other British cases on the subject were found. In contrast
to the English situation, all the relevant American decisions
were handed down after paintings were protected by United
States law," but still the rule of Turner was picked up without looking at its probable foundation.
If the above hypothesis about the lack of statutory coverage
for paintings is rejected as the basis for the distinction between the rule for publication of statues and the rule for the
publication of paintings, then the decision quite obviously
indicates that under laws covering both, different rules for
the publication of each type of art should still exist. Such a
distinction has failed to survive, although at least one early
treatise does note the different holdings.' 2 However, the
modern notion is to drop the distinction as a later edition of
that work does.' 3 Yet not only does the distinction disappear,
the Turner rule for paintings is adopted for both types of art.
Such an inclusive adoption comes in spite of the language
differentiating the two, and in spite of the above analysis
which indicates that the Turner courts would now favor the
statue standard for publication.
Furthermore if Turner v. Robinson were first being de"025 & 26 Vict. c. 68 (1862).
1116 Stat. 212 (1870).
" W. COPINGER, LAw OF COPYRIGHT 359 (4th ed., Easton 1904).

"F.

E. SKONE JAMES & E. D. SKONE JAMES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES

ON COPYRIGHT 23 (9th

ed. 1958).
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cided now under United States copyright law, a general
publication would be found. A modern court would not turn
to a breach of trust argument or to an analogy to performances of plays; instead a court would employ the limitedpublication doctrine which includes the other methods of
approach.
One of the definitions of limited publication says that a
distribution
which communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely
selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of
diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is considered a "limited
publication," which does not result in loss of the author's commonlaw right to his manuscript; but that the circulation must be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it can not be called a
private or limited publication. 14
The last part of the definition clearly applies to an exhibition with rules against copying. The exhibition, which communicates the contents of the painting, may restrict the
public's use of the work, but if the display is open to a general audience, it ought to be a publication.
The two earliest American cases on art exhibitions as publications were New York decisions, the reports of which are
very incomplete. 5 The facts of the earlier one, Oertel v.
Woods, were stipulated by a demurrer, which began:
The plaintiff Oertel is an artist. He composed and painted a picture
intended to illustrate that portion of the Christian faith which affords
the greatest comfort to its believers, and he borrowed from one of
the most beautiful hymns that piety has produced a name for the
composition, viz., "The Rock of Ages." 16
Oertel licensed his co-plaintiff James to reproduce the art,
and James made lithographic copies. It was then discovered
"White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952). (Emphasis
added.)
Oertel v. Woods, 40 How. Pr. 10 (N.Y. Special Term 1870) ; and Oertel v.
Jacoby, 44 How. Pr. 179 (N.Y. Special Term 1872).
"40 How. Pr. 10, 11 (N.Y. Special Term 1870).
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that the defendant Woods was marketing photographs of the
original painting. Oertel and James obtained an injunction
prohibiting Woods from distributing his photographs on the
grounds that the plaintiffs' common-law rights were violated.
The reported decision was on a motion to dissolve the injunction.
The report consists largely of the argument for Oertel and
James, with no space alloted to the defendant. The opinion
of the court, by Mr. Justice Cardozo, takes up only a few
lines.
The plaintiffs contended that common-law rights existed
in a painting until the painting was published. Part of the
argument said:
The picture may be exhibited, and ten thousand may see it, and
carry away its ideas, as they could carry away the ideas of a lecture,
but the proprietary right still remains uninjured. Nothing short of an
absolute sale of the manuscript, or of the original painting, can
deprive the authors thereof of their proprietary interest therein. Anything less than this is but an exercise of the right of exhibition, which
the law permits
to be made without injury to the right of absolute
7
ownership.'

However this assertion was based on an exceedingly narrow conception of publication, for earlier the plaintiffs had
contended that
as nothing short of a sale of a manuscript by the author of a book
can, in the one case, divest him of his proprietary right, so on the
other, nothing short of the sale of the original painting can divest
the artist of his proprietary right therein.' 8
Surely, though, publication can be effectuated in many ways
different from just the sale of the original manuscript. 9
In spite of the plaintiffs' incorrect contention, the court
agreed with them. Cardozo said: "This cannot be distinguished in principle from . . . Turner v. Robinson." 20 This
18Id.
"See note 1, supra.
" Id. at 19.
Oertel v. Woods, 40 How. Pr. 10, 24 (N.Y. Special Term 1870).
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rationale is of course unenlightening about what constitutes
the publication of a work of art.
In Oertel v. Woods the defendant's photographs evidently
were of the original painting. However, in Oertel v. Jacoby
the defendant copied the authorized lithographs of The Rock
of Ages. Consequently the defendant argued that the making
of the copies was a publication of the original painting-an
argument rejected in Woods-but then he went on to contend
that the copies were published when they were sold to the
public. Thus, Jacoby concluded, copies could legally be
made from the James reproductions. The court agreed that
the uncopyrighted publicly circulated lithographs had been
published and could therefore be duplicated.
These brief reports leave out an important fact. The
crucial distinction between the two cases is that in Woods the
alleged infringing copies were made from the original while
in Jacoby they were made from published copies. The fact
left out is how the photographs of the original were made.
Were they taken by stealth or published as a breach of trust
or were they taken at a public exhibition which did not have
restrictions on copying? The reports contain no hint on the
matter, but if the photographs were obtained in some deceitful
manner, it would not seem illogical to assume that the plaintiff would have stressed that fact in order to have made a
more favorable comparison with Turner v. Robinson. And the
flat assertion that an exhibition was not a publication might
imply that Woods did take the photographs at a showing that
did not have restrictions on reproductions. If so, Cardozo's
judgment against the photographer was a holding that an
exhibition with no prohibition on copying is not a publication.
However, that conclusion is obviously tenuous so both Oertel
cases can hardly be convincingly cited for any such proposition.
The two Oertel cases present some of the considerations of
Turner. American copyright protection was not extended to
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paintings until 1870, and presumably the painting here could
not have had statutory protection. In addition, since Burrow.

Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony21 and Alfred Bell & Co.,
Ltd. v. CataldaFine Arts, Inc." had not been handed down,
the plaintiffs probably did not view the authorized lithographs
as independently copyrightable. Consequently, the choices
here were between extending common-law protection and
stripping the painter of any reproduction rights.
Some of those considerations had been eliminated by the
time the next two relevant cases entered the courts. Both
actions were instituted by Emil Werckmeister, a German
national doing business as the Photographische Gesellschaft
in Berlin. The results of the two were to produce inconsistent
ways of viewing exhibitions as publications.

One of the two, Werckmeister v. Springer Lithographing
Co., was instituted in the Southern District of New York, in
1894, and concerned a painting entitled Floreal-"a halflength figure of a girl, with flowers falling on her head and
lap." ' The painting's French creator had exhibited the work
in the salon at the Palais de l'Industrie, in the ChampsElysees, Paris, in May, 1892. Later the artist sold the original, but he expressly reserved the reproduction rights.
Shortly thereafter these rights were assigned to Werckmeister.
Werckmeister copyrighted Floreal in the United States and
produced lithographic representations of the flower girl.
However, the defendant was also making copies of that same
work, and Werckmeister brought Springer Lithographing to
court.
The defendant made several arguments all coming to the
conclusion that the painting had been published without
notice of copyright and was consequently in the public
domain. One contention claimed that since a reproduction of
Floreal was present in the catalogue of exhibits distributed
2 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
- 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
2'63 F. 808, 809 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894).
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at the showing in the Palais de lIndustrie, the painting was
published. District Judge Townsend disagreed:
This was an illustration not taken from the painting, but from a very
superficial crayon sketch printed in the catalogue of the salon where
the painting was exhibited prior to the assignment to the complainant.
It was not intended to be a copy of the painting. The purpose of the
catalogue was merely to furnish to the holder of the catalogue information regarding the paintings described, and perhaps to recall
the paintings to the memory afterwards. It was not intended to serve
in any way as a copy of the painting. No one would think of considering it as a work of art. Such a printing would at most be a
qualified or limited publication, which would not work a forfeiture
of the right of copyright. Such use of catalogue is under the implied
qualification that the privilege 2shall
not be extended beyond the
4
purpose for which it was granted.
That explanation does not really make the rationale clear.
Was there no publication because there was no copy or because the copy was published with enough restrictions to
constitute only a limited publication? If the former reason
were the holding, then a photograph of a painting used in a
similar catalogue would be a publication, while the photograph would not be if the second part of Townsend's statement were the rationale. However, perhaps more should be
known about such a catalogue before deciding whether a
photograph in it should be considered as a publication. For
instance, important facts bearing on whether the artist's actions evidence an intention to give up control of his art might
include: whether the catalogue is sold or distributed free;
whether the artists have expressly given their consents to
have copies of their art so reproduced; whether the users are
made aware of any limits on the use of the catalogue; and
whether the catalogue becomes a possession of the user.
Surely, if the catalogue is sold outright to the gallery-goer
without any communication of restrictions on use of the
pamphlet, the contents of the catalogue have been published
" Id. at 812.
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if the artists whose works are incorporated in the booklet
have agreed to such a reproduction of their art.2 5 It must be
admitted that this is a guess, however, since no other cases
about the publication of paintings through copies in exhibition catalogues exist. And the court here did not even mention
such factors as those listed above, much less attempt to balance the policy implications of each; consequently little
guidance was given to future courts on the matter.
Springer Lithographing never raised the possibility that
the exhibition of the painting itself might have been a divesting publication. But even so, the court assured counsel that
no disastrous slip-up had been made:
Defendant has not claimed that the exhibition of the painting in the
salon at Paris was a publication, so that is unnecessary to decide
that point. It would seem that such an exhibition would not be a
publication unless the general public was permitted to make copies
at pleasure. In the absence of direct evidence, such permission will
not be presumed. It would seem that such exhibition of the painting
and use of the catalogue were under an implied qualification that the
use should not be extended beyond the purpose for which it 2was
6
granted, and that such special use did not constitute publication
The entire statement is dictum, but three conclusions can
be drawn from it. First, an exhibition with restrictions against
duplication is not a general publication. Second, an exhibition without such regulations probably is a general publication. Third, a rebuttable presumption is established that such
prohibitions existed at the gallery. These three points of
course were also indicated in Turner v. Robinson. However,
as was seen above, the result in the British case was possibly
predicated on the fact that the British copyright law did not
then protect paintings. The American laws did cover such art
at the time of Springer Lithographing,but the court ignored
the possibility that that might distinguish the foreign case
' See note 1, supra.

SWerckmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 F. 808, 812-13 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1894).
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from the dispute before the court. In addition the court just
stated a conclusion without giving any analysis as a step in
reaching that result. This judgment was not appealed.
The matter of exhibition as publication was directly raised
in the litigation instituted in the Circuit Court for the District
of Massachusetts. 7 The disputed painting was by one G.
Naujok. Werckmeister had obtained the copyright on the
work, but the canvas had already been displayed at Berlin's
Kunsthandlung von Schulte, a public art gallery, five months
earlier. Pierce & Bushnell Manufacturing Company, which
had allegedly produced copies of the painting in violation
of the copyright, claimed that the exhibition constituted a
publication. The court, through District Judge Putnam, disagreed:
[A] mere exhibition of a picture in a public gallery, like that at
Berlin, does not, at common law, forfeit the control of it by the
artist or owner, unless the rules of the gallery
provide for copying,
2
of which there is no evidence in this case.
Once again the results paralleled those of Turner v. Robinson.
This time the loser appealed, and the judgment was reversed."9 Circuit Judge Colt, writing for a majority, said:
The evidence shows that the painting was publicly exhibited in
Berlin, from January to March, 1892; and at Munich, in the summer
of 1892. Under these circumstances, we hold that the alleged copyrighted painting has been "published," . . . and should have been
inscribed with notice of copyright in order to entitle the plaintiff
to maintain this action for infringement.30
This conclusory statement is entirely inadequate. It was
neither preceded nor followed by analysis or citations. In
light of the statements in Turner, Springer Lithographing,
and the decision below, this lack of discussion becomes frus"Werckmeister v. Pierce & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 63 F. 445 (C.C. D. Mass.
1894), rev'd, 72 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1896).
2IId. at 447.
'Pierce & Bushnell Mfg. Co. v. Werckmeister, 72 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1896).
ald. at 58.
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trating, for two opposite ways of treating exhibitions now
appear in the cases without any attempt to explain the difference. District Judge Webb dissented from the appellate
court's opinion, but he did so without any opinion of his own,
and thus the frustration becomes compounded.
These conflicting lines of interpretation did not merge
until the first decade of this century. Once again Emil Werckmeister was the complainant. This time the dispute concerned
W. Dendy Sadler's creation of Chorus-a painting of "a convivial group of gentlemen gathered about a punchbowl, holding pipes and filled glasses in their hands, and singing in a
chorus." " On April 2, 1894, Sadler gave Werckmeister the
right to reproduce the painting. On April 16, 1894, photographic copies of the picture were deposited with the Library
of Congress, and Werckmeister thereby obtained the copyright on Chorus. However, starting the next month and running through August, 1894, Sadler displayed the painting at
the Royal Academy at London without affixing any copyright
notice to the work. In addition it was found that "the painting
while on exhibition was for sale at the Royal Academy, but
with the copyright reserved, which reservation was entered in
the gallery sale book." 32 Furthermore,
the public are not admitted to said exhibitions, except upon payment
of an entrance fee, but that members of the Academy and exhibitors
and their families are entitled to free admission, and that the
following rule of the Academy is strictly enforced, namely: "No
permission to copy works during the term of the exhibition shall
on any account be granted." 33
Sadler subsequently sold the original to a Mr. Cotterel of
London. Cotterel was told that the copyright was already
owned by someone else, and at the time of the trial the work
was hanging in Cotterel's dining room.
' Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).

'American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 287 (1907).
' Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 322
1904).

(2d Cir.
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The American Lithographic Company produced "cheap
copies" of the painting as part of an advertising campaign
for the American Tobacco Company. Werckmeister brought
copyright infringement actions against both companies.
The defendants claimed that the exhibition published the
painting, and the trial court agreed.
It is true that the artist, by displaying the picture, has wronged the
complainant; but he has also misled the public, and has been able
to do this by the failure of the complainant to see to it that the duty
[of affixing the copyright notice] imposed by the statute was fulfilled.
...It is to be presumed that, in consequence of such nonfulfillment,
the persons intended by the statute to be warned that the painting
was copyrighted
have not been so advised, and have acted accord34

ingly.

The Supreme Court, which subsequently held that Chorus
was not published at the exhibition, indirectly replied to
Judge Thomas. Justice Day, writing for a unanimous court,
said:
It would seem clear that the real object of the statute is not to give
notice to the artist or proprietor of the painting or the person to
whose collection it may go, who needs no information, but to notify
existing copythe public who purchase the circulated copies of the 35
right, in order that their ownership may be restricted.
Thus at first glance the difference in interpretation as to
the purpose of the copyright notice causes the difference in
results. This part of the decision as to whether the display
was a publication of the painting was determined not from
the facts of the exhibition, but from the policy behind the
copyright notice. Although this may be a worthwhile approach, Day's reasoning fails for covering insufficient ground.
Day's statement only envisions two segments of the relevant public-the buyer of the original painting and the
buyers of the published copies. These two sets, however, do
not comprise the entire field, for viewers of the copies and
"Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 117 F. 360, 362 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1902), rev'd 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
'American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 294 (1907).
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viewers of the original also exist, and Day did not consider
them. It can be said that the viewers of the copies are of no
concern because they will see the copyright notice on the reproductions, but that still leaves the viewers of the exhibited
original, who could possibly make copies of the original
without knowing that it was protected.
This last worry, of course, is of no concern here because
the infringing advertisements were probably not produced in
any innocent way. The original went from the control of
Sadler to a dining room in a private home. The purchaser
knew that someone else held the reproduction rights, and
there is nothing to indicate that the buyer allowed copying
by American Tobacco or American Lithographic. Instead
the pictures in the advertisements were no doubt produced
from Werckmeister's copies which contained the copyright
notice. Consequently, as in Turner the court's feelings would
have been leaning in favor of the plaintiff.
Thus the Supreme Court's result might be justified by the
facts of the case, but Day was laying down a principle
broader than one just to cover this controversy. And the
principle may be too wide to be equitable in all circumstances. As stated above, even though the copyright might be
reserved, this would not be apparent to the viewer of the
painting; according to the facts of this case, he would have
had to have looked in the gallery sale book. Surely, though,
many people go to an exhibition just for the aesthetic experience and without any intention of making an acquisition, and
thus these persons might not look in the sale book. Such a
viewer might realize that most galleries do not allow photographs, but maybe, just maybe, this viewer will be an innocent
Robinson, who, when back home will reconstruct the grouping
for his camera. The probabilities of this are not high, but
if it happened the copier could make a convincing argument
that he was not given adequate notice of the copyright.
Werckmeister appealed the circuit-court decision. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had never
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decided the question of whether an exhibition of a painting
was a publication of the art, but the court did have the
opinions of its lower courts and of a sister circuit to build
on. Doctrine demands unity, so the obvious thing for the
court to do was either to attempt a Hegelian sort of synthesis
of the conflicting views or just to reject one of the ways of
interpretation. The Second Circuit did neither; the court did
hold that the exhibition at the Royal Academy was not a publication, but in so doing the court felt constrained to make the
following comment about Pierce & Bushnell:
It is true that this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals in
the First Circuit by a divided court. But the opinion appears to be
based on the assumption, in the absence of proof that copying was
prohibited, that the painting was publicly exhibited, and therefore,
published within the meaning of the copyright act.36
Perhaps the Second Circuit had access to additional sources
of information, but the report of Pierce & Bushnell contained
no intimation of such an assumption. Instead a more reasonable interpretation of the earlier decision would be that an
exhibition is always a publication.
The court, however, was not content just to attempt a
dubious reconciliation with a past case; the court did present
reasons of its own. First, Judge Townsend, writing the unanimous opinion, stated the applicable principle:
A general publication consists in such a disclosure, communication,
circulation, exhibition, or distribution of the subject of copyright,
tendered or given to one or more members of the general public, as
implies an abandonment
of the right of copyright or its dedication
37
to the public.

Then the court went on to decide that the exhibition here was
a limited publication.
It is not perceived how the legal status of a right of copyright in a
painting or statue, so far as concerns their publication, can be disWerckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 329 (2nd Cir.
1904).
'd.

at 326.

Art Exhibitions and Common-law Copyright 99
tinguished from that of lectures or dramatic compositions. In fact,
such distinctions as may be suggested only serve to strengthen the
presumption of limited publication in favor of the work of art. There
the author may wish to enjoy the profit from exhibition of the
original and from the right to publish copies, but his chief object
often is to secure the profit arising from the sale of the original
work. The exhibition of a work of art for the purpose of securing a
purchaser or an offer to sell does not adversely affect the right of
copyright; and from the fact that the right protected by statute in a
work of art is that of copying and not of exhibition is derived the
general rule that the mere exhibition thereof is not a general publication. . . . In a limited publication, as of a play, there is no dedication to the public, no presumption or recognition of a right to
copy, and therefore no abandonment of said right. In the case at bar
not only was there no presumption of a right to copy, but there was
an express denial of such right. Whether said exhibition would have
amounted to a publication in the absence of any such prohibition is
of this case, and upon that question we
immaterial to the disposition
38
express no opinion.
The court here held that the exhibition in question was not
a publication of the art. But what was the rationale for such
a holding? Was it because the painting was being displayed
in order to find a buyer? Or was there no publication because
the Royal Academy had rules against copying? Or were both
factors necessary? Once again a court's reasoning was incomplete, for the opinion does not give the answers. Instead, the
only definite conclusion to be made is that the court does not
decide whether an exhibition without restrictions on copying
is a publication.
The opinion goes on to repeat both the reasons:
It must be conceded that the author of a work of art does not lose
his common-law copyright by exhibition in his studio for purposes
of sale, and that the same rule would be applied to an association of
artists exhibiting their work in a common gallery solely for this
purpose.... The extent of the publication to such members of the
public as chose to pay the fee was a permission to view the exhibition, but a prohibition to make any copies of the paintings therein.
This prohibition clearly expressed the limitations implied in the
38Id.
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private lectures or the dramatic performance, namely, a prohibition
of any use inconsistent with the purpose for which the exhibition
was given.39

This, too, fails to make explicit the deciding rationale.
And the rationale could be important, for there must be some
galleries where paintings are for sale with no express prohibition against copying or with no adequate enforcement
measures for such a policy, while there surely are museums
that have the requisite rules against reproduction, but do not
conduct sales.
The Supreme Court, when it considered the exhibition of
Chorus, did not mention the "securing of a purchaser" reasoning. Instead the high court based its decision solely on the
fact that the Royal Academy had rules against copying:
...the exhibition of a work of art where there are by-laws against
copies, or where it is tacitly understood that no copying shall take
place, and the public are admitted to view the painting on the implied
understanding that no improper advantage will be taken of the
privilege [does not amount to a general publication].
We think this doctrine is sound and the result of the best considered cases. In this case it appears that paintings are expressly
entered at the gallery with copyrights reserved. There is no permission to copy; on the other hand, officers are present who rigidly
enforce the requirements of the society that no copying shall take
place....
We do not mean to say that the public exhibition of a painting
or statue, where all might see and freely copy it, might not amount
to publication within the statute, regardless of the artists' purpose
or notice of reservation of rights which he takes no measure to
protect. But such is not the 40
present case, where the greatest care
was taken to prevent copying.

This is the first time a court's opinion was influenced not
only by the fact that there were rules against copying but
also because the prohibition was "rigidly" enforced. This
seems wise, for a rule which was easily broken would not
stop the spread of reproductions of the art. But the opinion
11
0 Id.

at 330.
" American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907).
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does not detail what enforcement measures were taken at the
Royal Academy. Furthermore, the court made no attempt to
suggest what would be less than adequate enforcement.
Bound up with enforcement is the matter of communication
of the rules to the gallery's patrons, but the court neither explained how such communication was effectuated nor does
the opinion even vaguely indicate any standards about the
giving of such information.
The court's statement also left out any mention of the presumption first floated in Turner and later picked up in the
lower-court opinions. Evidently the Supreme Court felt that
enough information was before it so that a presumption did
not have to be determinative, but the bypassing of the presumption did leave its status unclear.
Furthermore, although the court quite clearly did indicate
that at least some exhibitions would not produce a publication of the displayed art, the opinion withheld judgment
about exhibitions lacking regulations against copying. Thus,
even though the implications of the early opinions were that
common-law rights were divested unless the gallery had restrictions on duplication, this problem has not been authoritatively resolved.
However, there have been lower-court opinions about that
unsettled area. One of the few reported decisions concerning
the publication of sculpture enters here.4
Not too long after American Tobacco, a monstrous 60-foot
elk was constructed which straddled a busy Butte, Montana,
street. The constructor built it under cover and then unveiled
it as part of a public celebration. When displayed the elk
contained the notice, "Copyright. Infringers beware." But
this legend did not deter the defendant from selling post-card
reproductions of this rather unique arch.
District Judge Borquin held that a publication had taken
place and that the work could not be validly copyrighted.
"Cairns v. Keefe Bros., 242 F. 745 (D. Mont. 1917).
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Copyright, in analogy to patents, is to reward originality, inventive
genius, and to encourage it to put out its productions for public enjoyment and benefit, which otherwise the author proprietor might
withhold having right and power to do so, for his exclusive use and
pleasure. If, however, the production is intended for or bound to be
given free and unrestricted public exhibition-to attract the public
to come and enjoy without price-and, if it is so displayed, there is
publication of the thing and dedication to the public, again in
analogy to patents, defeating copyright. For this display inevitably
exposes the production to copy, and so is inconsistent with the claims
of copyright; and the latter cannot be preserved by any notice
thereof hung upon this exhibit. This accords with the spirit of the
law, and is suggested by American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister....
That is this case. Plaintiffs built the structure for public free
exhibition, and were bound to yield it to such. They could not
withhold it. This elk could no more be copyrighted than Liberty
Enlightening the World, or the Dewey Arch, or the Washington
42
Monument, and no one will seriously claim these latter could be.
This statement gives two steps in reaching the result of a
judgment for the defendant. The second concludes that this
piece of art could never be copyrighted as long as it was displayed in the manner it was. That part of the holding has
been criticized; a suggestion has been that although the correct result was reached, the decision should have been based
on the inadequacy of the notice.43
Although Borquin's analysis may seem novel, it is not
entirely without logic. A statue displayed as this one was will
surely be seen by many with cameras, and perhaps those
viewers will be so moved by the sight so as to want to preserve the image photographically. There appears to be no
way to stop such infringement. The artist must be aware of
that fact, so it might be fair to conclude that the artist was
dedicating his work to the public. Of course this principle
would mean that a public exhibition of any work of art where
no effective rules against copying existed would preclude a
copyright on the work even though the art contained the
"Id. at 745-76.

' LATTAN, supra note 1, at 66.
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notice in proper form. Thus Borquin's analysis runs counter
to the basic idea that statutory protection starts with publication with notice, not that a publication of a statue prevents
any protection whatsoever.
More important here is the holding that the exhibition
published the elk. As has been seen, the trend of the cases
decided before 1917 might be taken to indicate that publication ensued from a display without prohibitions on duplication; but this is the first decision holding that a specific
exhibition was a publication. Borquin, however, did introduce a new concept by stressing that this was a free showing.
Money did not seem to be a determinant in the cases discussed
above, nor is money considered necessary in the usual defini44 and its introduction seems to lead to
tions of publication,
unfortunate results. To hint that if admission fees had passed
hands no publication would have occurred means that if the
artist had displayed the work, to get remuneration from it,
he would not have lost his common-law rights. Presumably
then the artist could indefinitely retain those prepublication
rights even though the public was being exploited by the
artist-an idea which seems contrary to the principle of the
copyright system that allows a monopoly to the artist only
for a limited time after the public has access to the work.
Another dubious factor in Borquin's comments is his comparison of originality in copyright to originality in patent
law. The two, however, are in no way equal, as Alfred Bell &

Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. made clear.45

Thus, the Cairns case, interesting as its results may be,
hardly forms the firm foundation for any statement about
exhibitions as publications.
"See note 1, supra.
"It is clear, then, that nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be striking unique or novel . . ." and "a patentee, unlike a
copyrightee, must not merely produce something 'original'; he must also be
'the first inventor or discoverer.'" Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
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Nor is the foundation shored up by Pushman v. New York
Graphic Society Inc., 46 which also contains vague references
about the publication of a painting being caused by a display. In 1930, the painter, Hosvep Pushman, sold his uncopyrighted When Autumn is Here to the University of
Illinois. The sales agreement made no mention of reproduction rights. In 1940, the university granted the New York
Graphic Society a license to copy the work. Pushman sought
an injunction restraining the sale of the resultant lithographs
as a violation of his common-law copyright. Although it is
not clear from the statement of the case, apparently the paint:
ing had been on public display at the University of Illinois.
In a somewhat confusing opinion the trial court denied
relief. The court produced alternative reasons for its result.
One rationale said that a sale of a painting without an express
reservation of reproduction rights transferred those rights to
the purchaser. The other rationale referred to publication:
In this case the absolute sale and delivery of the painting without
any condition, reservation or qualification of any kind, to a stateowned public institution where it has been displayed for a long
period of time, constitutes an abandonment of all the plaintiff's
rights and a publication and dedication47 to public use free for enjoyment and reproduction by anybody.
This statement leaves many unanswered questions. For
instance: Are both a sale and display necessary? Does the
purchaser and displayer have to be a public institution? How
long is a long period of time? Perhaps the most interesting
aspect of this statement is the holding that the artist published
his painting because after he unconditionally sold the work,
the purchaser displayed it. Perhaps if the university had
stored When Autumn is Here, the court would not have held
that the picture was published. Thus, the court might have
1625 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941), aIJ'd, 262 App. Div. 729, 28
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dept. 1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
47
Id. at 34.
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been saying that although Pushman published the painting,
the actual acts constituting the publication were not controlled
by him.
The New York Court of Appeals,4" after the Appellate
Division affirmed without opinion,49 upheld the judgment on
the grounds that Pushman had given up his common-law copyright by selling the painting without making a reservation
of rights. The court expressly refused to consider the matter
of publication: "We are not entering into a separate discussion as to whether by this sale and the public exhibition the
artist is to be held to have 'published' the work so that his
common law right is lost." '0 Consequently, Pushman does
not make any advance in the knowledge about art exhibitions as publications.
A decision more clearly holding that an exhibition of a
work of art was a publication of the work is Morton v.
Raphael.5 Morton painted a mural on the walls of the Great
Lakes Room of Chicago's Knickerbocker Hotel. Raphael was
an interior decorator hired to furnish the room; after finishing, he took photographs of his work. These photographs also
reproduced Morton's mural, and when Raphael had the pictures published in a nationally circulated magazine, Morton
brought suit for infringement of a common-law copyright.
The court held that those rights had been divested because the
mural had been published by the exhibition of the art.
It is apparent . . . that plaintiff, under hire by the Knickerbocker
Hotel, made the first publication of the murals when she painted

them on the walls of the Great Lakes Room where they52 could be
seen and were undoubtedly observed by many persons.
This is the most recently reported decision touching on the
subject of exhibition of works of art as publication. This case
- 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
" 262 App. Div. 729, 28 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dept. 1941).
287 N.Y. 302, 308, 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1942).
" 334 Ill. App. 399, 79 N.E.2d 522 (1st Dist. 2d Div. 1948).
11Id. at 400, 79 N.E.2d 522, 522-23 (1st Dist. 2d Div. 1948).
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is also the first and only one holding a painting published by
exhibition; but like all the other decisions we have considered the opinion leaves much to be desired. For instance, it
is not clear whether the hotel guests could have copied the
murals-in other words the court did not make any mention
of the fact which had been dispositive in nearly all similar
disputes. Indeed, the court never cited the Werckmeister series
of cases and just based its decision on general principles of
publication. Actually, this case conflicts with American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, for the court here finds publication just because many people could see the mural, and
such a rationale does not depend on any facts about prohibitions against reproductions.
As in other cases, however, factors other than neutral
principles about publication may have been placed on the
judicial scales. Here the predisposition was against the
painter.
If the murals were as artistic and effective as all the parties concede,
it would seem that plaintiff was rather benefited from the publicity
afforded, than damaged thereby, and it would be quite strained to
hold that her name, reputation and income as an artist had been
seriously and permanently damaged. 53
For this reason and for the lack of analysis, this last decision in the line of cases touching on exhibitions of art as
publications, like all the opinions that precede it, is unsatisfactory.
This study has shown that the resolution of tension in the
field of exhibitions of art as publication has not been successful-although the definite rule that exhibition with prohibi5Id. at 405, 79 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1st Dist. 2d Div. 1948). For a case with a
similar factual basis see Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d

Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940). There the court held that any
common-law copyright would have vested in the commissioner of the painting,
and thus the painter had no standing. The Morton court, as an alternative
holding, gave the same reasoning.
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tions on copying is not a publication has been promulgated,
the opinions establishing that holding have been poor; the
extent of the rule is unknown because of inadequate discussions of the notice or enforcement problem; and the wisdom
of the rule is unclear because the courts have used insufficient
and faulty reasoning or incorrectly borrowed doctrines from
similar, but not really analogous, situations. Furthermore,
no rule about exhibitions lacking restrictions on duplication
has been authoritatively established, although the trend deducible from the cases is that works of art so shown would be
regarded as published. Since the status of the later exhibitions is still uncertain, there is time to discuss the logic of
holding those exhibitions as publications, in hopes of reducing the existing tensions.
A few scholars have made comments about such a holding.
One, an early commentator, said exhibition should equal
publication:
It is submitted that the exhibition of a picture in a public gallery
is a publication. It seems to afford the public an opportunity of
making every legitimate use of the contents of the picture. They
could not make any greater use of the contents if they bought an
engraving of the picture. It would
nbt even then be lawful for them
54

to make copies of the picture.

A later scholar has concluded that the common-law rights
should be lost only when copying is not stopped. "Publication
takes place where the work is exhibited in a way that, in the
absence of a claim of copyright notice, would make it accessible for public copying." " But not all have agreed with
these conclusions.
It is submitted that mere exhibition of a work of art should no more
constitute a publication than does the public performance of a
dramatic or musical work. In neither case do members of the public
receive into their possession tangible copies of the work. Thus, in
e' E. McGILLVRAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
SLATMAN, supra note 1, at 66.

262 (1902).
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neither case would publication result. Since judicial decisions on this
question are as yet meager, with no court of last resort expressly
holding that mere exhibition constitutes publication, it is hoped that
future cases will establish that exhibition without actual or offered

public sale or other disposition of tangible copies does not constitute
publication.5"

Those who view an exhibition as always being a limited
publication usually make an analogy to performances of
plays and oral deliveries of lectures. Those comparisons
were urged by the plaintiff in Turner v. Robinson, and they
received mention in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic
Co., besides being urged by Melville Nimmer. Interestingly
one court specifically rejected a paralleling of Ferris v.
7 a leading case holding
Frohman,5
that a public performance
of a dramatic work was not a publication, with the exhibition
of a painting:
In the Frohman case the owner of the play had not dedicated the
work to the public, whereas in the case at bar the murals were un-

doubtedly dedicated to the public when they were painted on the
walls of the hotel room with plaintiff's name endorsed on each of

the murals, open to the inspection of anyone who visited the hotel.58
Admittedly that statement is more conclusory than analytical, but no more so than those which proclaim a painting to
be like a play. Furthermore it should be stressed that the
rationale of Ferris v. Frohman was that under the settled decisions of the common law as handed down in Great Britain,
a performance of a play was not a publication; the opinion
did not mention any specific policy reasons for the result
other than following established precedents." But the common law as made in Turner v. Robinson indicated that an
exhibition of a painting where there were no restrictions on
'Nimmer, supra note 1, at 199. (Footnotes omitted.)

57223 U.S. 424 (1912).
' Morton v. Raphael, 334 Ill. App. 399, 403, 79 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1st Dist.
2d Div. 1948).
' For a discussion of Ferris v. Frohman see R. Roberts, Publication in the
Law of Copyright, ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SyMPosiumr NUMBER NINE 111,

123-27 (1958).
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copying would be a publication. Similarly, the trend of the
American cases has been in that direction. It would seem
then that a policy reason for holding no publication should
be found before the drift of the decisions should be altered.
The main justification for the narrow interpretation of publication would appear to be that the art has not been reproduced in a visual form-that it has not been published in the
layman's sense of the word. But, of course, such a reproduction is not always necessary for publication.6" On the other
side is the argument that with no rules against copying,
persons with no knowledge of wrongdoing could innocently
infringe the art. Since it can be expected that those seeking
protection would have better information about the law than
the general public, the balance ought to be tipped against
the artist.
Doctrinal unity would clearly indicate that exhibitions
ought to be publications. As we have seen, a general publication occurs when a distribution of the work is made to the
public at large even though the distribution may be for a
restricted purpose. 6 ' Clearly an exhibition open to the public
falls within that rule. Of course, so does a performance of a
play. However, the results in the drama situation were predicated on precedent, not logic, and so a good argument can
be made that the Ferris ruling is an anomaly; consequently
the play precedent should not be controlling elsewhere.
Perhaps the countering argument is that protection should
not be taken away in a dubious situation unless the artist has
gained monetary benefits from the public.62 The percentage
of works of art which accrues money from display prizes or
just from the exhibition is not known, but it should also be
said that income from the work has not always been necessary to constitute a publication."
Although it may be correct now to say that few artists make
"1See text accompanying note 14, supra.
r- For an economic interpretation of publication, see Roberts, supra note 57.
' See note 1, supra.
' See note 1, supra.
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much money from exhibitions, it seems plausible that artists'
income from displays of newly created works of art will increase in the future. A significant portion of recent art has
not chosen to use a neatly packaged form; instead there
seems to be increasing showings of multi-media art, walkthrough art, and other types that cannot easily be placed in
the homes of private collectors. Probably this kind of art will
only be exhibited at a gallery, and thus the artists' traditional
sources of income-sale of the original and sale of reproductions-will be eliminated. Instead it seems as if the only
money the creator will be able to obtain will be from admission charges collected from the public coming to see the work.
If so, then not to hold the exhibition a publication would be
to grant a perpetual protection to a monopolistic moneymaking opportunity. The wisdom of such a grant has been
questioned by the Copyright Office,
This result-perpetual protection for works disseminated in any
other manner than publication-seems contrary to the principle
embodied in the provision of the Constitution (art. I, sec. 8) empowering Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right
to their . . . writings." 64
Of course these points about doctrinal unity and perpetual
monopoly apply equally to exhibitions that do not allow
copying as well as to those that do, and by the logic of the
preceding paragraphs all exhibitions should be publications.
Another problem is that a high percentage of exhibitions
are for the purpose of finding purchasers for the work. Typically a solicitation for a manuscript has been regarded as a
limited publication because it is a distribution to a limited
class for a limited purpose. But a sale of a painting through
an exhibition is different. The writer of a short story or a
book, in an attempt to find a buyer for his work, sends his
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 1 REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 39 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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manuscript to Playboy or Random House. The editors at
those institutions decide if they want to publish the work. If
not, the writer sends the manuscript on elsewhere. In this
process the work is seen by only a small number of people
who are interested in obtaining such works and who probably
have some knowledge of copyright law. In no way can it be
said that the general public has seen the work. However, the
same is not true of the art sale. At many galleries conducting
sales, the doors are open to the public. The artist is hopeful
that one of those members of the public will want to buy. The
artist in such a situation is offering his work to any person,
not to a limited class of people. In addition, the artist is
surely aware that many viewers will have entered the gallery
not for the purpose of making a purchase, but just for the
pleasure of seeing art. At least one commentator has realized
that such an exhibition would not be a limited publication
because it was a solicitation for a sale:
However, where a work of art is sold, if such sale was not preceded
by a general offer of sale made to all members of the public and if
the right of reproduction is expressly or impliedly reserved by the
seller, then under the principles discussed in connection with limited
publication. .. the sale should not constitute a surrender of common
law rights.6 5
This statement, of course, implies that without the restrictions listed such an offer of sale would be a publication. An
exhibition open to the public with the art on sale would be
an offer without the requisite restrictions.
The Supreme Court, it will be remembered, avoided considering any of these issues in American Tobacco. One of the
court of appeal's rationales in American Lithographic was
that the exhibition in question was to obtain buyers for the
paintings and was therefore only a limited publication. The
Supreme Court refused to use this logic and solely held that
the painting was not generally published because it was ex'Nimmer, supra note 1, at 199 n.112.
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hibited at a gallery with rules against copying. Consequently,
an exhibition should not be regarded as a limited publication
merely because the display is for the purpose of finding a
purchaser for the art.
As we have seen, the rules about exhibitions as publications are not settled. Perhaps one portion of the area does
have a firm result, and so it might be wise to counsel artists
to show their works only at places that prohibit copying. But
effective enforcement of such a restriction will not always be
feasible-for instance, stopping photographs at street art
fairs surely would be difficult. In addition, the logic of
American Tobacco is suspect. Consequently, anyone attempting to counsel artists should feel the insufficient resolution
of the tension caused by the application of the concept of
publication to art exhibits.
One way to reduce the tension is to revamp the copyright
system. Consequently, we will conclude by looking at how the
new copyright proposal would affect exhibitions of art.66
The most significant change, of course, would be that the
period of copyright protection, instead of running for a
fixed period from the date of first publication, will last from
the instant the work is fixed until fifty years after the death
of the creator.67 The bill would specifically extend statutory
rights to unpublished works.6" A copyright notice would be
required on all "publicly distributed copies from which the
work can be visually perceived," 69 but omission of the notice
would not carry as many dire consequences as it does now.
(a) Effect of Omission on Copyright-The omission of the copyright notice prescribed by sections 401 and 402 from copies or
phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the copyright
owner does not invalidate the copyright in a work if:
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively
small number of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public; or
'Under

discussion here is S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
-Id. §104.
Id. §401.

"Id. §302.
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(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made
within five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that
are distributed to the public in the United States after the omission
has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in writing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's
of copies or phonorecords,
authorization of the public distribution
70
they bear the prescribed notice.
The second part of section 404 removes liability from innocent infringers of works without the copyright notice.
These are significant improvements over the present system, for under the new proposal there would be little advantage in delaying the date of publication, but the suggestion
is not without its problems. Most of the troubles stem from

the definition of publication, which reads, "'Publication' is
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending." 71
The first problem comes with the word "copies." That
term is also defined:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with aid of machine or device. The
other than a phonoterm "copies" includes the material objects,
72
record, in which the work is first fixed.
Clearly an original artwork would be within the definition

of copies, but it is not clear if just the distribution to the
public of that original would be a publication-that definition speaks in terms of copies and does not mention copy.
Of course if the distribution of the original were not a publi-

cation, then the distribution of a single reproduction would
not be either. But at least I can see no practical distinction

between the distribution of two copies and the distribution of
,oId. §404.

-,'Id.§101.

-Id.
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one, and apparently the Copyright Office agrees that the distinction should not exist.
In other words, the placing of one or more tangible objects embodying the work in the hands of "the public" constitutes "publication,"
regardless of whether the objects are sold, given away,73 lent or
distributed under some sort of rental or lease arrangement.
The next problem is with the phrase "to the public." 74
The Copyright Office's Supplementary Report said:
"The public" in this context is intended, very generally, to refer to
persons who are under no express or implied restrictions with respect to the disclosure of a work's contents, but we believe the situations are so variable that this particular
concept of "the public" is
75
better left undefined in the statute.
That explanation implies that an exhibition would be a publication, for even if the gallery had rules against copying, the
patrons would still be able to describe the painting to others.
Further support for the position that exhibitions would be
publications came out of the discussions about copyright revision conducted by the Copyright Office. Sydney Kaye,
counsel for Broadcast Music, Inc., in referring to the term
the public in the definition of publication, said, "This would
mean that motion pictures and similar works, which are not
disseminated to the public at large, would never be published,
perhaps with consequences in other areas." 7 6 Kaye came to
this conclusion because films are only rented or lent to theater
owners, not to the public, much as an artwork is lent to the
gallery owner, not the public.
But Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights, said
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'The bill defines "publicly" as: "To perform or display a work." S.543, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. §101. But that definition does not appear to be applicable to the
definition of publication.
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that the definition of publication was meant to include the
distribution of motion pictures. If so, the definition ought to
include the lending, leasing, or renting of an artwork to an
art gallery.
Another aspect of the definitionis that not all distribution
of copies to the public are publications, but only the ones
expressly listed in the definition. Specifically, exhibition is
not mentioned. Interestingly, that word did appear in an
earlier draft, but has been dropped.7" Consequently, the definition would seem to treat exhibitions in no prescribed
manner; instead, the facts of each exhibition should be
scrutinized to see whether they fall within the boundaries of

publication.
Most exhibitions, of course, would be within that term.
Either there will have been a sale of the art work to the art
gallery, or the art object will have been rented, leased, or lent
to the showing place-but not always. The one obvious exception would be if the artist exhibited the painting himself.
It is not clear whether that exemption was an intentional
omission; it may be doubtful whether the drafters had artists
in mind when drawing up the formulation, but it is possible
that they were aware that under a similar analysis a playwright producing his own drama or a composer singing his
own songs would not be publishing his works. The merits of
such an exemption may be arguable, but whatever the substance in that distinction, the new system would end the
categorization of exhibitions into those with rules against
copying and those without, unless some court would feel inclined to reach out and hold that an exhibition with rules
against copying was not a distribution to the public. Such an
interpretation would bring back the old complexities which
revision has intended to eliminate, however.
' "Publication would be defined elsewhere as the sale or other transfer of
ownership, or the rental, lease, or lending of copies or records of the work to
the public. It would not include public performance or exhibition." REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS,
COPYRIGHT LAW
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18 n.14 (1961).
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Once again, however, it should be stressed that the
perimeters of the definition would not be as important under
the new system as they are now. In fact the major significance
of the term would be in section 104. The first part of that
section extends copyright protection to published works if
on the date of first publication the author is a national or
domiciliary of the United States or of a country with which
the United States has a copyright agreement; if the work was
published in the United States or one of those treaty nations;
if the work was published by the United Nations or the Organization of American States; or if the work comes within
the scope of a presidential proclamation.
Publicationis also used in the notice provision:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a
notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all
publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually
perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.78
A brief conclusion, then, is that the tension which copyright law produces in its use of the term publication can be
resolved in two ways. The first method is to attempt more
specific definitions. The new proposal has utilized this way,
and from appearances the reformulation, while not completely eliminating all problems, will ease the tension.
Another method of reducing the trouble is to lessen the
results that hinge upon the problematic area. Then even if all
contingencies have not been considered-as exhibitions of
art as publications have probably not been consideredattention will less likely have to be focused on the tension.
The new copyright proposal uses this resolution more fully.
Thus because legal rights will not depend as much on the fact
of publication under the new system as now, the tensions
centered on exhibitions of art as publications will be lessened.
" S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §401(a) (1969).

